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Dear Sir, 
In 2009, the emergence of the new H1N1 influenza vi-
rus saw the world brace itself for the first influenza pan-
demic since 1968. Two years after, it is time to evaluate 
the situation of that Influenza A(H1N1) pandemic and 
its combat measures. 
First, alert level was raised rapidly from level 3 to level 
6 in 6 weeks. On 25 April 2009, the WHO declared a 
level 3 Influenza Pandemic Alert. Three days after, level 
4 alert was declared due to international spread of clus-
ters of human-to-human transmission. The continuous 
confirmation of new cases in various countries required 
the WHO to raise the pandemic alert to level 5, less 
than 1 week after declaring level 3. The maximum alert 
response was declared on the 11th of June, meanwhile 
most human infections appeared to be mild [1]. Recent 
study analysed the records of past influenza outbreaks to 
determine a definition for pandemics. The authors con-
cluded that defining an influenza pandemic on the early 
observations may be adequate to declare an alerting re-
sponse but doesn’t assure worldwide spread or excess 
mortality [2].
Second, the WHO reported an estimate of 22-33% of 
secondary attack rate among contacts of H1N1 influ-
enza, however chemoprophylaxis was given to contacts 
without previous studies regarding its effectiveness in 
outbreaks or epidemics. Contacts received antivirals 
for 10 days, meanwhile patients with mild and moder-
ate symptoms of influenza received antivirals for only 5 
days [3]. A study published in 2009 proved that second-
ary attack rate among house hold contacts of cases of 
H1N1 was only 7.6%, which was much lower than the 
reported figures by the WHO. This study also proved 
that rates of infection did not differ significantly in those 
receiving chemoprophylaxis compared to household 
contacts that didn’t receive chemoprophylaxis [4].
Third, use of masks by the general population and in air-
ports proved to be inefficient and unnecessary. It rather 
gave a sensation of panic and insecurity. A study was 
done in France to evaluate the use of protective measures 
in prevention of acute respiratory symptoms for French 
participating in Hajj of 2009. This study showed that al-
though 79% of the subjects used facemask this didn’t 
significantly reduced the acute respiratory symptoms 
among them [5]. A recent systemic review evaluated the 
effectiveness of facemasks in prevention of H1N1 infec-
tion and concluded that wearing face masks for infected 
people could protect others but there are fewer data to 
support the use of face masks for prevention of H1N1 
infection. This review recommended more research on 
the natural infections in the community to define the 
effectiveness of facemasks for prevention of influenza 
virus transmission [6].
Fourth, controls for body temperature in airports did not 
show to be effective to control the spread of the virus and 
alerted people more. A study was done to retrospectively 
assess the feasibility of detecting influenza cases upon 
relying solely on fever screening. The findings proved 
that the sensitivity of fever for detecting H1N1-2009 
cases upon arrival was estimated to be 22.2% among 
confirmed H1N1-2009 cases, and 55.6% of the H1N1-
2009 cases were under antipyretic medications upon ar-
rival to a Japanese airport [7].
Fifth, the compulsory vaccination campaign for health-
care workers (HCWs) was inefficient and created nega-
tive attitude towards the vaccine. Vaccine coverage was 
very low between HCWs. A recent Italian online survey 
demonstrated that Influenza A(H1N1) pandemic modi-
fied the behaviour of HCWs, however a high percentage 
did not realize that vaccination is a fundamental means 
of prevention and how important it was that they get 
vaccinated [8].
Sixth, in many cases antiviral oseltamivir was used mas-
sively to treat cases with mild symptoms of influenza. 
Many European countries recommended antiviral drugs 
for treating all patients, even those with mild symptoms. 
This medically unsupported recommendation alarmed 
the general population and opened up a debate about the 
availability of these drugs for the population worldwide 
if there were to be a sustained influenza A (H1N1) pan-
demic. Moreover, almost all the strains of H1N1 that cir-
culated in 2008-2009 were resistant to oseltamivir. The 
incidence rate of resistance among patients varied from 
3.6 to 27.6%. This resistance was associated with the de-
velopment of pneumonia with a statistically significant 
relative risk of 4.16 in a recent systematic review [9]. 
The consequences of antiviral resistance could lead to 
person-to-person transmission with oseltamivir resistant 
strains of H1N1 influenza virus. This transmission was 
documented in a recent study in a haematology unit in 
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the United Kingdom and showed that 50% of the patients 
inside the unit were infected by direct transmission by 
the resistant strains of H1N1 Influenza 2009 virus [10]. 
Lastly, according to the available data on the mortality 
of cases of Influenza A(H1N1) pandemic it was no-
ticed that the mortality rate in general was very low 
1.62% [11]. Mortality rate was quite lower (0.9 per 
100.000 inhabitants) among confirmed Argentinean 
cases aged above 60 years old [12]. These reports con-
firm that the mistaken perception of virulence was per-
petuated which in turn, created irrational fears for both 
the illness and unfair, uninformed expectations for its 
remedies. 
Lessons from Influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 2009 could 
help in the development of new protocols and guidelines 
to control future pandemics.
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The 2009/10 pandemic constituted a major test of our 
understanding of how to utilise the most modern means 
of prevention of a widespread infectious disease. The 
pandemic plan drawn up by the World Health Organiza-
tion was tested in the field, and displayed both merits 
and limitations.
Basically, the plan aimed to slow down the spread of the 
pandemic and mitigate its consequences. The first aim 
was pursued by implementing measures already tested 
during the SARS outbreak, in order to throw up a sani-
tary cordon. The limited efficacy of using masks, both 
as personal protection devices and as a means of pro-
tecting others, however, had been known for some time. 
A further attempt to prevent the disease from crossing 
national boundaries was made by measuring the body 
temperature of travellers at border check-points. Never-
theless, it was well known that the only truly efficacious 
means would have been to implement protection with a 
ring prophylaxis using antivirals [1].
For what concerns drugs, it is well known that the virus is 
able to become resistant, as has been amply demonstrat-
ed in the case of the amantadanes [2]. By contrast, with 
regard to neuroaninidase inhibitors, up until the H1N1v 
pandemic only sporadic cases of resistance to Oseltami-
vir had been observed, while Zanamivir, not least on ac-
count of its mode of administration, did not seem to give 
rise to large-scale phenomena of resistance [3]. Clearly, 
the weakness of the therapy and prevention of influenza 
is linked to protocols which utilise a single drug.
With regard to vaccination, several logistical problems 
had to be tackled. These can be summed up as the need 
to promptly deploy an abundant supply of efficacious 
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vaccine. In this perspective, the pharmaceutical compa-
nies had been preparing themselves since 1997, when a 
virus lethal to man, namely the H5N1 avian virus, made 
its appearance on the epidemiological scene [4].
The WHO plan had envisaged since phase 4 that the 
pharmaceutical companies should initiate production of 
the vaccine [5]. It is interesting to note that the manufac-
turers were able to produce a large quantity of suitable 
vaccine within the required time. 
In phase 4, however, it was not possible to predict 
the true gravity of the H1N1v pandemic, even though 
cases already appeared to be relatively mild during the 
“Mexican” pandemic. Indeed, the pandemic of 1918 
was characterised in the spring of that year by a first 
wave with mild clinical symptoms and a benign course, 
so much so that it was called a 3-day fever. It was the 
second wave, which began at the end of August and 
peaked in October-November, that would become the 
“killer wave”. 
Thus, in April-May 2009, the lethal potential of the 
H1N1v virus could not yet be established, as, with 
the benefit of hindsight, it later was. Starting from the 
principle that the wisest strategy is to prepare for the 
worst, a large-scale vaccination campaign was pre-
pared by the developed nations, Italy among them. If 
any problem did arise, it was caused by the lack of 
a precise, well-established plan; attempts to adopt a 
flexible approach ended up by generating disorienta-
tion and confusion not only among the public but also, 
and in the first place, among doctors and other health-
care workers.
First of all, adequate training was not provided for doc-
tors, particularly paediatricians. No less serious was the 
fact that doctors and other healthcare workers failed to 
promote vaccination. In addition, the information cam-
paign promoted by the Ministry of Health proved inef-
fective, as it was principally aimed at avoiding panic in 
the population. Indeed, the campaign displayed serious 
lack of truth with regard to the potential risks linked to 
the spread of the H1N1v virus. Finally, the campaign 
undertaken by the CODACONS (Consumers’ Associa-
tion) against the purchase of the vaccine by the Ministry 
of Health was also inappropriate; indeed if the virus had 
had such mutations as to render it “lethal”, as happened 
in 1918, the purchase of the vaccine would been a very 
wise decision.
In short, if the vaccine had been used properly, large 
savings could have been made, in that many cases of 
disease would have been avoided. Although not severe, 
these cases have constituted a considerable cost for Ital-
ian society [6].
Roberto Gasparini
Co-Editor
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